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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
not easily derived where such a variety of possible situations exist, and
it may be that varying factual situations will give rise to varying re-
sults even within a particular court. Nevertheless, the letter and spirit
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act appears to have
been more closely followed by the Fifth Circuit in Robinson than by
the Second Circuit in Pisacano.
The doctrine of separation of powers provides the judiciary with
an essential role: to identify, prevent, and correct abuses of laws man-
dated by Congress. In performing this role, its attitude should be one of
vigilance, rather than acquiescence. Every case decided outside of the
Second Circuit in which the Executive Assistant subscribed the At-
torney General's initials to the authorization to approve a wiretap ap-
plication has read literally the requirement that an "Assistant Attorney
General [be] specifically designated by the Attorney General." 232 This
requirement is not satisfied when such designation of an Assistant
Attorney General is made, not by the Attorney General himself, but
by his Executive Assistant affixing his initials.28 In holding to the con-
trary, the Second Circuit has taken a unique position, and one of
dubious validity.
GRAND JURY'S RIGHT TO DEMAND HANDWRITING EXEMPLARS
United States v. Doe (Schwartz)
The fourth amendment protects individuals against unwarranted
intrusions by the government into their private lives and personal
that case by the conclusion that defendant's guilt was established on the basis of evidence
obtained through wiretaps authorized by the Attorney General himself. Id.
Nearly all of the cases in which the Attorney General himself initialed the memoran-
dum delegating to the Assistant Attorney General authority to approve wiretap applica-
tions held that the evidence so derived was not obtained in violation of Congressional
mandate and could therefore be used: Pisacano; United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230 (2d
Cir. 1972); United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v.
Whitaker, 843 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Consiglio, 342 F. Supp. 556(D. Conn. 1972) (citing Pisacano as "laying down the rule of the law to be followed in this
Circuit on such matters," Id. at 558); United States v. Doolittle, 841 F. Supp. 163 (M.D.
Ga. 1972); United States v. D'Amato, 340 F. Supp. 1020 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v.
lannelli, 339 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. La Gorga, 336 F. Supp. 190(W.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Cantor, 328 F. Supp. 561 (ED. Pa. 1971).
The lone exception was United States v. Casale, 341 F. Supp. 374 (M.D. Pa. 1972), in
which it was held that the signing of the Assistant Attorney General's name to the applica-
tion for a court order to wiretap by the Assistant's Deputy violated the procedure man-
dated by § 2516(l), and that the memorandum designating the Assistant Attorney General
to authorize the particular application would not suffice to satisfactorily authorize the
application itself.
In United States v. Aquino, 338 F. Supp. 1080 (E.D. Mich. 1972), there were two
memoranda at issue, one initialed by the Attorney General, the other by the Executive
Assistant. As to each the court followed the majority rulings outlined above.
232 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1).
28$ See note 230 supra.
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effects.234 The Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he security of
one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police- which is at
the core of the Fourth Amendment- is basic to a free society."235
Questions remain, however, as to what exactly is covered under this
blanket of protection.
Terry v. Ohio236 offered one standard for judging the area that
falls within the fourth amendment's protection, that is, ".... wherever
an individual may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy' ... he
is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. 23 7
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Doe (Schwart), 23 8 applied this
criterion in deciding whether a grand jury's request for handwriting
exemplars from a subpoenaed witness fell within the ambit of the
fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. Appellant refused to furnish such exemplars until the Govern-
ment presented evidence of probable cause for such a demand.2 39 The
234The fourth amendment's warrant requirement is designed to ensure that the
decision to invade an individual's personal privacy and freedom will be based on an im-
partial showing of probable cause and that reasonable limits will be placed on the scope
of the intrusion. As the United States Supreme Court has indicated, "reasonableness"
turns, at least in part, on the more specific commands of the warrant clause: "probable
cause" for the warrant and its issuance by a "neutral and detached magistrate." Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453, rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 874 (1971); Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760-61 (1969). See Tentative Draft, ABA PRojEcr ON MnmIum
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUsTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SuRvEiLLANCE § 5.4
commentary (1968). The warrant's "probable cause" requirement must therefore be in-
terpreted as crucial to the scheme of the fourth amendment.
235 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (evidence obtained by illegal search and
seizure was admissible in state courts), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(fourth amendment protection extended to state criminal prosecutions).
236 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Here the relationship between the police and a citizen in a stop
and frisk situation was examined in the light of the fourth amendment standard of reason-
ableness.
2371d. at 9.
238 457 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1972). Appellant, Cynthia B. Schwartz, had been subpoenaed
to appear before a grand jury which was investigating possible mail and wire frauds. She
refused to comply with the request to give the grand jury a handwriting sample, asserting
her rights under both the fourth and fifth amendments.
289Appellant presented two arguments here: first, she argued that the Government
had to show the "reasonableness" of its request for the handwriting samples; second, after
the Government had submitted an affidavit to District Judge Lasker to substantiate its
request, appellant interjected a higher standard, contending that the Government had to
prove "probable cause" for its demand. 457 F.2d at 896.
As stated earlier, "reasonableness" turns, at least in part, on the more specific com-
mands of the warrant clause: "probable cause" for the warrant and its issuance by a
"neutral and detached magistrate." See note 234 supra. This point was emphasized in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971) when the Supreme Court repeated
Mr. Justice Jackson's classic statement on the warrant requirement:
The fourth amendment's] protection consists in requiring that [the usual in-
ferences which reasonable men draw from evidence] be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Id. at 449, quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
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United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
agreed that the government had sufficiently shown the reasonableness
of its request and directed the appellant to produce the samples.240
After reviewing the inapplicability of the "self-incrimination"
privilege of the fifth amendment in this area,241 the court of appeals
emphatically refused to extend the fourth amendment protection to
handwriting or voice samples, placing these identifying characteristics
in the realm of public communication, 242 and thereby releasing the
government from the burden of showing either the reasonableness of
the demand or probable cause. Handwriting samples were held to be
encompassed within the term, "persons," under the fourth amendment.
The court concluded, without any further explanation, that decisions
involving constitutionally protected "papers" are therefore "marginally
relevant at best."'248
The court drew a distinction between the "seizure" of a person by
a grand jury subpoena and by police detention. "The latter is abrupt,
The United States District Court for New Jersey has recently drawn a distinction be-
tween "reasonableness" and a "general fishing expedition" with respect to a grand jury
request for handwriting exemplars. In In re Riccardi, 337 F. Supp. 253, 256 (D.N.J. 1972),
Judge Whipple held that the defendant's fourth amendment rights would be violated if
the grand jury, which identified the defendant as a "target" although its investigation gave
rise to only "mere suspicions," could obtain exemplars of his handwriting. The court also
held that an individual's handwriting, as well as his fingerprints, are within areas of per-
sonal security protected by the fourth amendment. Id. at 255.
In a recent Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. Dinsio, No. 72-2413 (9th Cir.,
Sept. 15, 1972), it was held that the government must not only submit to the court an
affidavit supporting its contention that a grand jury's request for finger and palm print
exemplars was "reasonable," but must also make such affidavit available to counsel of the
witness to afford him an opportunity to determine the applicability of the just cause
criterion of 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1970) (by which a witness who "refuses without just cause
shown to comply with an order of the court to testify or provide other information" may
be confined). The court pointed out that the defendant "cannot be expected to demon-
strate just cause in a factual vacuum." Slip opinion at 3. The court dismissed concern
that the disclosure of the affidavit would breach the secrecy of grand jury proceedings and
added that "... modest breaches of grand jury secrecy may well be required when non-
disclosure would defeat fundamental constitutional rights, including the right to due
process of law." Id.
240 Mrs. Schwartz again refused to give the exemplars and Judge Lasker subsequently
cited her for civil contempt, with a sentence of thirty days. 457 F.2d at 896.
However, there have been cases where witnesses were permitted to withhold testimony
from a grand jury. See, e.g., Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972); In re Evans, 452
F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 430 (1972); Hoffman v. United States, 341
U.S. 479 (1951); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951).
241457 F.2d at 896. Handwriting exemplars generally do not constitute "testimony"
and as such are outside the protective shell of the fifth amendment. In Gilbert v. Califor-
nia, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), the Court held that a mere handwriting exemplar is not a testi-
mony or a communication but an "identifying physical characteristic" beyond fifth amend-
ment protection. Id. at 266-67.
242 "Handwriting and voice exemplars fall on the side of the line where no reasonable
expectation of privacy exists." 457 F.2d at 898.
243 Id. at 897.
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[and] is effected with force or the threat of it [while] ... [a] subpoena
is served in the same manner as other legal process .... ,"244 This
distinction paved the way for rejecting the rationale of three Supreme
Court cases, Schmerber v. California,245 Terry v. Ohio,246 and Davis v.
Mississippi,24 7 all of which involved some type of police detention. 248
244 Id. at 898.
245 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). Defendant, involved in a car accident, was taken to a hos-
pital where a police officer placed him under arrest on the grounds of possible intoxication
and ordered that a blood sample be taken from him. Rejecting the argument that the
withdrawal of blood from a suspect and the admission of the chemical analysis into evi-
dence violated the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, the Court pointed to
the distinction between two kinds of evidence-communications or testimony and real or
physical evidence. Only the former is protected by the fifth amendment. See 8 J. WIG 1oM,
EVIDENCE § 2263 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
The Court went on to state that submission of a defendant to a blood test, finger-
printing, photographing, or writing and speaking tests is for identification purposes only
and is not a communicative act. The defendant's participation in these activities is purely
as a donor of physical evidence and so does not force him to give testimony. The results of
a lie detector test, on the other hand, would result in testimonal evidence. The reasoning
is that, although the detector records are physical, they are aimed at determining the
truth of testimony and are, therefore, communicative. 384 U.S. at 764.
246 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See note 236 supra.
247 394 U.S. 721 (1969). Without securing warrants, police brought a large number of
black youths to the police station for both questioning and fingerprinting. The defendant's
fingerprints were found to match those found at the scene of the crime but the Court
reversed the conviction, finding that the defendant was illegally detained and, therefore,
the fingerprints could not be used in evidence.
In discussing the nature of fingerprints, the Court placed this type of evidence outside
the sphere of a person's private life. Id. at 727. The Second Circuit in Doe (Schwartz) used
this classification to support its contention that if fingerprinting, "surely more nearly
private than exemplars of the voice or handwriting .... " is not an intrusion of privacy,
then a demand for a handwriting sample is certainly not. 457 F.2d at 899. But see
Weintraub, Voice Identification, Writing Exemplars, and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 10 VAND. L. REv. 485 (1957), where the author illustrates a clear distinction
between handwriting samples and fingerprints:
In short, the creation of a handwriting exemplar is an act involving the veracity
of the accused. He can lie. If he is talented enough to successfully disguise his
handwriting, he may even deceive the police and throw them off the trail.
In this respect, handwriting exemplars are to be distinguished from finger-
prints, body markings, blood tests and other examinations of the body of the
accused ....
Id. at 497.
248457 F.2d at 899. The appellant contended that the government was accomplishing
through the grand jury's subpoena power that which it could not othervise do since
there was no probable cause to issue a warrant for her arrest. The Seventh Circuit, in In
re Dionisio, 442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971) cert. granted, 406 US. 956 (1972), accepted a
similar contention and held that a seizure which violates the fourth amendment cannot
be accomplished through the misuse of the grand jury's subpoena power.
The Second Circuit answered this argument by stressing the historical role of the
grand jury "as a protective buffer between the accused and the prosecutor." 457 F.2d at
899. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960); Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 10-11
(1887).
Whether the traditional role of a grand jury as a "buffer" is still accurate today has
been the subject of some debate. In England, grand juries were abolished in 1933 (pre-
sumably because they no longer served the traditional function). The procedures initially
established to protect an accused, such as complete secrecy, now arguably provide no such
benefit. The grand jury has been called "a rubber stamp for prosecutors," District Attor-
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While the court did not consider the grand jury proceeding to
be a "seizure," this did not foreclose the possibility of an unreason-
able "search." Applying the test of whether there is a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" to the "search" in question, the court found
exemplars not to be included within the category deserving of such
privacy. It reasoned that "nothing is being exposed to the grand jury
that has not previously been exposed to the public at large." 249
By rejecting even the more "modest requirement" of reasonable-
ness, the Second Circuit has taken a position in conflict with both the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits. The leading Seventh Circuit case, In re
Dionisio,250 concerned a refusal by the witnesses to furnish voice ex-
emplars in a grand jury investigation.2 51 As in Doe (Schwartz), the
issue was whether the voice samples belonged in that realm of privacy
which is protected by the fourth amendment. Expounding the proposi-
tion that "[c]ompelling a person to farnish an exemplar of his voice is
as much within the scope of the fourth amendment as compelling him
to produce his books and papers," 252 the Seventh Circuit equated voice
exemplars with documentary evidence,253 a relationship which the
Second Circuit had deliberately rejected in favor of placing these
exemplars under the category of "persons." 254
Following this rationale, the Seventh Circuit subsequently held,
in In re Mara255 that the government must establish, by providing an
ney, Office of Philadelphia, ANNUAL REPORT 1952 at 40 as quoted in Coates, The Grand
Jury, The Prosecutor's Puppet: Wasteful Nonsense of Criminal Jurisprudence, 33 PENN.
BA.Q. 311, 316 (1962). "The grand jury almost invariably returns a true bill, unless (it
may be) the district attorney hints or suggests that he doesn't think a case has been made
out." Id. at 314.
It seems, as Doe (Schwartz) illustrates, that the grand jury is being used, not to protect
an accused but to get evidence from him which he would not otherwise be compelled to
give. 457 F.2d at 899. "The increasing professionalization of the federal prosecutional
establishment .... and the devising of new means to compel testimony give the grand jury
a fearsome potential power." Tigar and Levy, The Grand Jury as the New Inquisition, 50
MAcH. S.BJ. 693, 696 (1971) (emphasis added).
249 457 F.2d at 899.
250 442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 406 U.S. 956 (1972).
251 The FBI, pursuant to a court ordered wire tap, had recorded certain phone con-
versations. Defendants were called before the grand jury, told that they were potential
suspects in its investigation and were requested to give voice exemplars which would be
compared with the FBI tapes. The Government apparently could not identify all of the
recorded voices and, therefore, needed these voice samples as valuable evidence for
possible indictment against these defendants. Id. at 278.
252 Id. at 279.
253 Id.
254 457 F.2d at 897. By following this line of reasoning, the Second Circuit focused on
cases concerning the type of fourth amendment protection given to the person, thus
eliminating the large body of cases dealing with searches and seizures of documentary
evidence.
255 454 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 406 U.S. 956 (1972).
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affidavit in open court, that the grand jury request for a handwriting
exemplar is reasonable.256
The Eighth Circuit, like the Seventh, has reached the conclusion
that handwriting exemplars are within the purview of fourth amend-
ment protection.257 However, that court of appeals was not faced
with the issue of grand jury investigation but rather with that of ordi-
nary investigations where fourth amendment protections have been
clearly defined. Nonetheless, since the court has recognized that these
exemplars are not ordinarily subject to public scrutiny, it is more
likely than not that it would extend such a holding to grand jury pro-
ceedings as well. 258
One factor that all three Circuits have ignored is that the accu-
racy and reliability of handwriting samples is highly suspect.25 9 The
Supreme Court, in Gilbert v. California260 held that handwriting
exemplars are not covered by the fifth amendment, stating that "[i]f
for some reason, an unrepresentative exemplar is taken, this can be
brought out and corrected through the adversary process at trial...." 201
However, the potential defendant before the grand jury has no right
to bring in his own expert witnesses to rebut the prosecutor's experts.
As Justice Fortas said in his dissent in Gilbert:
This is not like fingerprinting .... It is a process involving the use
256 1d. at 582.
257 United States v. Harris, United States v. Long, 453 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1972). The
Harris case concerned the acquisition of a handwriting sample from defendant, a juvenile,
who was under investigation for theft and forgery of a check from the United States mails.
Inspectors came to defendant's home and, in the presence of his parents, requested such a
sample, omitting to tell defendant that he had a right to refuse. Harris voluntarily gave
them the sample which the court of appeals later found admissible since the fourth
amendment does not protect against the voluntary giving of evidence.
In the Long case, defendant had been arrested by state officials with the aid of federal
agents who were also investigating the defendant for possible federal offenses. While Long
was in police custody, the federal agents requested a sample of his handwriting but failed
to inform him of his rights until after he had given them the exemplar. This evidence
was excluded on the basis that it had not been given voluntarily. The conduct of the
postal inspectors was not considered "unconstitutional police conduct," id. at 1321, the court
pointing out that no type of duress was used. Harris was free to refuse to give the
exemplars. The fourth amendment does not aim at discouraging citizens from aiding
police investigations.
25s The Eighth Circuit maintained that the police procurement of the handwriting
sample was a search for evidence of guilt and this evidence " . .must be obtained from
the person of the suspect himself, and it involves some intrusion into the privacy of the
person which the Fourth Amendment is intended to protect." Id. at 1320. By such a state-
ment, interestingly, the Eighth Circuit seems to follow the Second Circuit classification of
a handwriting sample as an element of the "person."
259 See Weintraub, Voice Indentification, Writing Exemplars, and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 10 VAND. L. REV. 485, 497 (1957).
260 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
261 Id. at 267.
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of discretion. It is capable of abuse. It is in the stream of in-
culpation. Cross-examination can play only a limited role in off-
setting false inference or misleading coincidence from a 'stacked'
handwriting exemplar.26 2
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has indicated that it is "an abuse
of the grand jury process for the Government to impose on that body
to perform investigative work that can be, and heretofore has been,
successfully accomplished by the regular investigation agencies of Gov-
erment."26
3
In short, the Second Circuit has provided law enforcement agen-
cies with a new evidence-gathering tool. Perhaps, as the Ninth Circuit
has held,264 the more fundamental question that should be answered
is whether the witness (potential defendant) is being afforded due pro-
cess of law. The degree of unreliability of handwriting samples and the
potential abuse that this may engender present serious constitutional
doubts. Our system of justice should not tolerate any procedure which
may so readily undermine basic constitutional protections.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL - Kirby DISTINGUISHED
Saltys v. Adams
The Second Circuit recently demonstrated its reluctance to follow
the spirit of the Supreme Court's latest ruling on the sixth amendment
right to assistance of counsel. Earlier this year, a plurality of the Su-
preme Court, in Kirby v. Illinois,265 held that "a person's sixth and
fourteenth amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the
time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against
262 Id. at 292 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
263 In re Mara, 454 F.2d 580, 585 (7th Cir. 1971).
264 In United States v. Dinsio, No. 72-2413 (9th Cir., Sept. 15, 1972); the court opined:
[Mjodest breaches of grand jury secrecy may well be required when nondisclosure
would defeat fundamental constitutional rights, including the right to due process
of law.
Slip opinion at 3. The Seventh Circuit has also decided that fifth amendment due process
considerations are "needed to protect citizens from infringement of their Fourth Amend-
ment rights through abuse of the grand jury process." 454 F.2d at 584.
265 406 U.S. 682 (1972). Kirby was stopped and asked to produce identification by
police who thought he was a suspect wanted for an unrelated offense. Kirby was carrying
travelers' checks and a social security card bearing the name Shard. He was arrested when
he could not satisfactorily explain his possession of these items. Upon arrival at the station
house, the police learned that one Shard had been robbed the day before. At the police
station and again at trial, Kirby was identified by Shard as one of the robbers. At the
time of the station house identification, no formal proceedings had been initiated, no
attorney was present and Kirby had not been advised of any right to counsel. Kirby was
convicted and appealed on the grounds that the identification confrontation violated his
sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel.
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